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This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the 
default risk of a sample of 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 2002. The 
main findings were: (1) ownership structure has significant effects on the accounting 
measure of performance return on assets (ROE). (2) Government shares are 
significantly negatively related to the firm’s performance ROE. (3) Defaulted firms 
have a high concentration ownership compared with non-defaulted firms. Also high 
foreign ownership firms have a low incidence of default. (4) Government ownership 
is significantly negatively related to the firm's probability of default. (5) Both mix and 
concentration ownership structure data can be used to predict the probability of 
default as the largest five shareholders (C5) and government ownership fraction 
(FGO) are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of the default. 
These results further suggest that reducing government ownership can increase a 
firm’s performance and but will also cause some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the 
short term. 
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Does ownership affect a firm's performance and default risk in 
Jordan? 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The effect of ownership structure and concentration on a firm’s performance is an 
important issue in the literature of finance theory. Ownership concentration may 
improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
However, it may also work in the opposite direction. There is a possibility that large 
shareholders use their control rights to achieve private benefits. Ownership structure 
and concentration are considered as important factors that affect a firm’s health. If the 
ownership structure and concentration affects a firm’s health, it is possible then to use 
the ownership concentration and structure to predict the probability of default (PD). 
 
Empirical studies of the relationship between the firm’s performance and ownership 
concentration and structure have produced mixed results. For example, Demestz and 
Lehn (1985) find no effect of ownership concentration on accounting profits, and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find no effect on the ratio of market value to 
replacement cost of assets (Tobin’s Q), although they find a positive effect of 
ownership by both corporate insider and investors. On the other hand, Leech and 
Leahy (1991) find a negative and significant relationship between the ownership 
concentration and the firm’s value and profitability. These studies and others listed in 
the literature review find conflicting results about the effect of ownership 
concentration on a firm’s performance. 
 
It is worth noting that most research on ownership structure and firm performance has 
been dominated by studies conducted in developed countries. However, there is an 
increasing awareness that theories originating from developed countries such as the 
USA and the UK may have limited applicability to emerging markets. Emerging 
markets have different characteristics such as different political, economic and 
institutional conditions, which limit the application of developed markets’ empirical 
models. Recent studies of corporate governance suggest that geographical position, 
the tax system, industrial development and cultural characteristics along with other 
factors affect ownership structure which in turn have impacts on a firm’s performance 
and its default risk (Pedersen and Thompson 1997). There is a significant lack of 
applied studies dealing with financial distress in Middle Eastern countries, especially 
in Jordan. 
 
Jordan provides an excellent case to study the relation between ownership structure 
and firm performance. Jordanian share issue privatisation is an on going program. 
Managing state holdings in Jordanian listed companies has become a top government 
priority. There is evidence that the government supports the private sector to take over 
and participate more in economic growth. Privatisation was part of the overall 
economic package that the government has adopted since the early nineties, namely 
the economic adjustment program, and self-reliance in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis that befell the country. Thus the government went though privatisation, as 
Jordan needs to open up its market to the world, through partnership agreements with 
the European Union (EU) and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The conclusions of some official surveys (“privatisation in Jordan” in Amman Stock 
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Exchange website) demonstrated “the prevalence in the public sector institutions and 
corporations of a large degree of inefficiency in the administrative and employment 
policies, squander of public funds, administrative archaism, substandard services and 
high indebtedness, while the private sector firms were yielding higher returns and 
results and generating better job opportunities, given the high level of efficiency in the 
administrative and employment policies.” Therefore, it is expected that the 
privatisation in Jordan can affect a firm’s performance and the probability of default 
in a positive way. 
 
Unlike previous studies, this study will investigate the effect of ownership structure 
on a firm’s performance and the probability of a firm’s default in Jordan. We argue 
that if ownership structure and concentration affect a firm’s performance, then it 
could be used to predict the probability of default (PD), as it could increase or 
decrease the firm’s performance. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the effects of ownership structure on firm performance. Section 3 
describes data. The independent variables used in the study and the model 
specification are introduced in section 3.2. Section 4 introduces the empirical analysis 
and the hypothesis test. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance has been an 
important research topic during the last three decades, and produced ongoing debate 
in the literature of corporate finance. Theoretical and empirical research on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance was originally 
motivated by the separation of ownership and control identified by Berle and Means 
(1932). Berle and Means (1932) suggested that an inverse correlation could be 
observed between the diffuseness (concentration) of shareholdings, and firm 
performance, in which ownership structure affects firm performance. Central to this 
analysis is the agency theory that explains the conflict of interest between inside 
owners and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, (1976): Fama and Jensen, 
(1983)).  
 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) argue that the relative amount of ownership held by 
insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the management 
of the firm) provide managers with the incentives to pursue activities to serve their 
own benefits. According to their hypothesis, both a firm’s value and its performance 
increase with the level of insider ownership. The agency conflict between the owner-
manager and outside shareholders is manifest from the manager’s tendency to 
appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. This 
view was challenged by Demestz (1983), who argues that the ownership structure of a 
corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect 
the influence of shareholders. According to Demsetz (1983), there should be no 




Demestz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership 
structure. They use a measure of the profit rate on a fraction of shares owned by the 
five largest shareholding interests, in which ownership structure is treated as an 
endogenous variable. They found no evidence of any relation between the profit rate 
and the ownership concentration. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) confirm the findings of 
Berle and Means (1932). They show the importance of the role played by large 
shareholders, and how the price of the firm’s shares increases as the proportion of 
shares held by the large shareholders rises. They argue theoretically for a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
 
Following these studies, there have been other studies examining the effects of 
ownership concentration on performance. Hill and Snell (1988) show that ownership 
structure affects firm performance as measured by profitability through strategic 
structure. Later, Hill and Snell (1989) confirm this positive relation for US firms by 
taking productivity as a measure of performance. On the contrary, Mc Connell and 
Servaes (1990) do not find evidence supporting any direct effect of large shareholders 
on firm value. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence in Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) 
supports the hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that the existence of 
large owners or a high concentration ownership leads to better management and also 
better performance, especially when ownership is concentrated in institutional 
investors rather than individual investors. Therefore, institutional ownership could 
increase a firm’s performance and decrease the probability of default. 
 
Leech and Leahy (1991) analyse the implications of the separation of ownership from 
control for a UK firm value. They describe ownership structure using several 
measures of concentration and control types. Therefore, ownership structure is 
expected to affect a firm’s performance through the effects of ownership 
concentration. They found that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value and profitability. Another study of the British 
case, Mudambi and Niclosia (1998) confirms this negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance. 
 
The conflicting results of the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s health point to 
the possibility of a non linear relation between ownership concentration and the firm’s 
health. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) ignore the endogeneity issue altogether 
and re-examine the relation between corporate ownership structure and performance. 
A cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms was taken in 1980. They measured 
performance by Tobin’s Q1, and managerial ownership as the combined shareholdings 
of all board members who have a minimum stake of 0.2%. They find no significant 
relation in the linear regressions using Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit rate as 
alternative measures of performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyse 114 
NYSE listed corporations in which a majority shareholder owns at least 50.1% of the 
common stock. They find that Tobin’s Q is higher if the majority owners are 
corporations, while Tobin’s Q as well as the accounting profit rate are significantly 
lower for firms with individual majority owners. 
 
                                                 
1 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement value of the firm, which can be measured 
as the market value of equity and debts over the replacement value of net fixed assets and inventory. 
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Other works followed the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study. Included among 
these studies are Cho (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al 
(1999), Holderness et al (1999), Loderer and Martin (1997), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) and Wu and Cai (2002). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) estimate the effect of 
managerial ownership and board composition on Q using panel data for five years. 
They find no relation between board composition and performance, but find a 
significant non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and performance, a 
positive relation between 0% and 1%, a decreasing relation between 1% and 5%, an 
increasing relation between 5% and 20%, and decreasing beyond 20%. 
 
Loderer and Martin (1997) used acquisition data to estimate a simultaneous equation 
model in which Q and insider owners are endogenous. Different variables are used to 
explain the insider owners, such as Q, log of sales, daily standard deviation of the 
firms stock returns, and daily variance of the firm’s stock returns. In order to explain 
Q they used log of sales, insider ownership, and a dummy for whether the acquisition 
is financed with stock. Insider ownership fails to predict Q, but Q is a negative 
indicator of insider ownership. 
 
Cho (1998), using cross-sectional data and ownership information from value line 
replicates the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study and finds a similar non-
monotonic relation between Q and management share holdings. 
 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) extend the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study 
by adding new variables to explain the variation in ownership structure. They used a 
fixed effects panel data model and instrumental variables to control various possible 
unobserved heterogeneities. Ownership structure is measured by the shareholdings of 
insiders. They find that insider ownership is negatively related to the capital-to sales 
ratio, but positively related to the advertising-to-sales ratio and operating income to 
sales ratio. After controlling these variables and fixed firm effects, they find that 
changes in ownership holdings have no significant impact on firm performance.  
 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) replicate the central aspects of the 
Demestz and Lehn (1985) study and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) study. They 
find a significant positive relation between firm performance and managerial 
ownership with a 0% to 5% range of managerial shareholdings. On the other hand, 
they do not find a statistically significant relation beyond 5% managerial 
shareholdings which conflicts with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny(1989). Furthermore, 
they confirm the endogeneity of managerial shareholdings. The managerial 
shareholding found to depend negatively on firm size, performance volatility, 
volatility squared, regulation, and financial leverage. 
 
Wu and Cui (2002) study the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s health. They 
found that there is a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
accounting profits, indicated by ROA and ROE, but the relation is negative with 
respect to the market value measured by the share price-earning ratio (P/E) and 
market price to book value ratio (M/B). Also, the contribution of government (state) 
and institution ownership is significantly positive to company profit, while negative to 
the market value. 
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Corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world and can produce different 
ownership effects on firms’ performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined at least 
three kinds of mechanisms in the world economies. In the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom, firms substantially rely on the legal protection of investors, 
and the ownership structure is dispersed. In Europe and Japan, there is less reliance on 
elaborate legal protections, and more reliance on large investors and banks. In the rest 
of the world, ownership is typically heavily concentrated in families, in which the 
legal protection is weaker than the other types of ownership.  
 
Due to the differences between US corporate governance and other systems such as 
the German and Japanese, different relations between ownership and firm value could 
be expected. For example, in Japan, where firm ownership is highly concentrated, a 
positive and significant effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is 
produced. Despite this argument, Prowse (1992) examines the structure of corporate 
ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. His empirical work 
indicated that there is no relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability. Opposing evidence is shown in Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck, 
Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000), whose results confirm the relation between 
ownership concentration and performance. 
 
 
Chen, Cheung and Stouraiti (2000) found a negative relationship between 
concentrated ownership and firm value for a sample of 412 publicly listed firms in the 
Hong Kong stock exchange through 1995-1998. Xu and Wang (1997) investigated 
whether ownership structure has significant effects on the performance of publicly 
listed companies in China. They find that ownership structures, both the mix and 
concentration of ownership have a significant effect on the performance of stock 
companies. There is a significant and positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm’s profitability. Also the effect of ownership concentration is 
stronger for companies dominated by shareholders than for those dominated by the 
state. Firms’ profitability is negatively correlated with the fraction of state owned 
shares. They also find that labour productivity declines as the proportion of state 
ownership increases. The coefficient for the fraction of the state owned shares are 
negative and significant, indicating that state ownership does not help to improve 
firms’ performance. 
 
In spite of all these efforts to investigate the effect of ownership structure on firms’ 
performance until now there are few studies of the effect of ownership structure on 
firms’ health especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, there is no serious work that 
used ownership structure to predict the probability of default.  
 




The data used in this study included 59 publicly listed companies on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2002. These companies belong to 
different industrial sectors: manufacturing, trade, steel and mining, utility, and real 
estate. The banking and insurance sectors are not included in this study as the 
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characteristics of these firms are different from the firms in the other industrial sectors 
in terms of financial statement, profitability measures and liquidity assessment.  
 
The data set contains detailed information about each enterprise. The major items of 
interest are: balance sheets, income statements, ownership structure, and the 
percentage holdings of all direct shareholders (defined as any owner possessing more 
than 5 and 10% of the company's shares). The full balance sheets and income 
statements are usually available from firms as the law requires disclosure.  
 
For data collection a clear and consistent definition of failure or default is required. 
While default is usually defined as a corporate condition in which a corporation has 
not been able to meet its obligations on a due date, different researchers have used 
different criteria to define default. For example, Beaver (1968) used a wider definition 
of default, which includes default on loan, over drawn bank account and nonpayment 
of a preferred stock dividend. Alternatively, default may be defined in a stricter legal 
sense as in Deakin (1972), where default includes only those firms which experienced 
bankruptcy or liquidation, and the firm faces legal action. 
 
In the case of Jordan, we define default as a firm that had a receiver or liquidator 
appointed, or a firm that was delisted from the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in the 
period 1989 to 20022. Furthermore, firms that stop issuing their financial statements 
for two years or more are also considered to be failed firms. By law, firms are 
obligated to submit their annual financial statements so firms that are unable to submit 
their financial statements on the required date are considered as failures. The date of 
failure is either the date the liquidator was appointed, or the date of delisting from the 
formal market. The actual number of defaulted firms is twenty-nine according to our 
definition compared to forty-four as officially claimed. Therefore, within 59 firms in 
our sample 29 are failed and 30 are non-failed firms. The non-failed sample was 
matched to the failed sample from the same industry and the same year of data 
collection. 
 
3.2 Variables Selection  
Using pooled data for the listed companies in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), we 
calculate four ratios to measure the firm’s performance, return on equity (ROE), 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and MBR. In this study Tobin’s Q and MBR are 
used to measure the market performance of firms, while the ROE and ROA are 
employed as measures representing accounting performance measures. These 
performance variables represent the dependent variables and are used separately. The 
explanatory variables are ownership fractions, concentration ratios and other control 
variables.  
 
To determine the ownership structure and its concentration, various measures of 
ownership concentration are constructed to measure the effect of ownership on a 
firm’s health. Our measures of concentration are the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholders (C1), the percentage of the two largest shareholders (C2), the 
percentage of the first three largest shareholders (C3) and the percentage of the first 
five largest shareholders (C5). We also used the Herfindahl index of ownership 
                                                 
2 This definition is very similar to the one by Izan (1984). 
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concentration, the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top 5 
shareholders. Table 1 and Table 2 present basic statistics for these concentration 
measures for defaulted and non-defaulted firms sample in the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE).  
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Insert Table 2 Here 
At the median, the largest shareholder C1 owns 22.39 per cent in the defaulted firms, 
a figure which is larger than 19.56 per cent in the non-defaulted firms. The largest two 
shareholders (C2) own 36 per cent in the defaulted firms, a figure which is larger than 
27.7 per cent in the non-defaulted firms. The other measures of concentration C3, C4, 
C5, and HERF are all larger in defaulted risk compared with non-defaulted firms. The 
median largest shareholder C1 in Jordan is large by the Anglo-American standards 
and but within the range of those in France and Spain which is 20 and 34 per cent 
respectively (Becht and RÖell 1999). The data also reveals that there is a substantial 
variation across firms in ownership concentration: Despite the high average, the 
largest owner’s value varies between 0 and 100 per cent. In this study we used C5 and 
HERF index as an indictor of ownership concentration to investigate whether 
ownership concentration increased firm's performance and contribute to firm's default.  
 
Most of the studies about the relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance used managerial (insider) ownership as the measure of ownership 
structure. Jordan has created different classes of shares, namely government (state), 
institutional, Arab, foreign, and individual (citizen). The government shares (state) are 
either share owned by government directly or by government agency. In firms with 
high government ownership, the insider gain control either through direct government 
appointments or through direct political power influence which could affect firm's 
performance negatively. These shareholders are different in their interests in the firm 
and their incentives and ability to monitor the firm. An important question to be 
addressed in this paper is whether ownership structure is consistent with the firm’s 
value and performance maximization.  
 
The ownership mix is divided into the fraction owned by government (FGO), by the 
foreigner (FFO), by companies (FIN), and by individuals (citizen). The government 
participates in about 62% of the 165 industrial and services firms. On the other hand, 
companies participate in about 95% of the 165 firms where the percentage varies 
between 6% and 99%. Foreigners participate in just 28% of the total number of firms, 
whereas the percentage varies between 0.006% and 87% (see Table 3).  
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
Controlling for both effects, ownership and performance, we might be able to 
distinguish which of these factors are more significant in poorly performing 
enterprises. This approach can, as a by-product of our study, serve as indicative 
evidence in the recent discussion, whether the ownership structure determines the 
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performance or whether the performance attracts various types of ownership. It also 
will help to answer the question of whether the ownership structure affects firms’ 
health and resources utilization via productivity.  
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
Table 4 presents the basic statistics of the ownership structure fraction of defaulted 
and non defaulted firms. At the median, the individual (citizen) owns 48.11 per cent 
of defaulted firms, a figure which is larger than 46.34 per cent in non defaulted firms. 
The fractions of foreigner ownership have the lowest median in the defaulted firms 
compared with 4.46 per cent in non defaulted firms. 
 
There are several notable differences. First of all, the defaulted firms do have a lower 
median of government ownership compared with non-defaulted firms. Also, the 
median of institutional ownership is lower in the defaulted firms compared with the 
non defaulted firms. Furthermore, foreigner ownership median in the defaulted firms 
are lower than the non-defaulted firms’ median. These initial results suggest that 
institutional, Arab, and foreigner ownership reduce the firms’ probability of default. 
In this analysis, we will concentrate on the joint factor of Arab and foreigner 
ownership rather than taking each one separately as both of them are considered 
foreign owners. Definitions of the performance variables, ownership fractions, and 
concentration ratios are given in Table 5. 
 
Factors other than ownership structure may also affect firm’s performance and health. 
To take them into account, we introduce a set of control variables. These control 
variables include ASS3, AGE, TD/TE, LTD/TA, NI/CAP, and TD/TA in this study. 
Dummy variables for industrial sectors are used to control the difference between 
sectors, DUMi, i= 1, 2,...,5, for manufacturing, trade, steel and mining, utility, and 
real estate. Definitions of these variables are given in Table 5. Furthermore, to control 
the effect of years on firms’ health and the probability of default, dummy variables for 




• 4. Empirical work 
• 4.1Ownership Structure and Firm’s Performance 
 
We employ three accounting ratios as well as Tobin’s Q to measure the firm’s 
performance, the market-to-book value ratio (MBR), ROE, and ROA. Let Y and CR 
represent performance and concentration ratio variables respectively. If ownership 
structure does not affect firm’s performance, we would find there is no correlation 
between Y and CR. Our first null hypothesis is that ownership concentration does 
affect the firm’s performance positively.  
                                                 
3 In the previous work, the value of total assets is used to control size effect, e.g. see Morck et al (1988) 
and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Other studies is used sales to control for size , e.g., see Xu and 
Wang (1997). The value of total sales is tried in this paper. It has a lower explanatory power than 
assets, and its inclusion in regressions of ROA and ROE makes the results not significant. 
4 The first two years data (both 1989 and 1990) are only used for determining whether the firm is 
default and non-default. 
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We estimate equation (1) to test the hypothesis for our sample. 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
( ) ( ) ( / )
( / )
Y Log Assets AGE TD TE
LTD TA Grow CR F e
β β β β
β β β β
= + + + +
+ + + +
                  (1) 
 
where Y is alternatively ROA, ROE, Q, and MBR for firm i as a measure of 
performance. The independent variables are represented by concentration ratio (CR), 
ownership fraction (F), log assets, age, TD/TE, LTD/TA, and Grow. Only C5 and the 
HERF are used as concentration ratios in the estimation to investigate the effect 
ownership concentrations on firm’s performance. F is alternatively FGO, FFO and 
FIN.  e is a error term. The results of the pooled regression are reported in Table 6 
where C5 is used for the ownership concentration indicator in Table 7 where the 
HERF is used for the indictor. 
 
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 Here 
The C5 variables were found to have a positive and significant impact on both ROE 
and ROA at least at a 5% level of significance for various equations in Table 6. The 
estimated coefficient of the HERF was only significant at a 10% level of significance 
in some of ROE and ROA equations. Neither the HERF nor the C5 have any 
explanatory power for both Q and MBR, although the sign of the coefficient was 
positive in both equations. In all of the regression, five industrial dummy variables 
were included as control variables and their coefficient were not significant at any 
level of significance. 
 
The significant impact of concentration ratios on ROE and ROA is in support of the 
Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis (1986) that large shareholders may reduce the 
problem of small investors, and hence increase the firm’s performance. These results 
are consistent with Abdel Shahid (2003); that ROA and ROE are the most important 
factor used by investors rather than the market measure of performance. This finding 
is also consistent with the result of Wu and Cui (2002) that there is a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits, indicated by 
ROA. The insignificant results of concentration variables in both Q and MBR 
equations could suggest that the Jordanian equity market is inefficient, or there could 
be other factors that affect the market performance measure, which were missed in 
our models.  
 
In summary, we find empirical evidence for the positive effects of ownership 
concentration on a firm’s performance using a sample of both defaulted and non-
defaulted firms. The positive effect of ownership concentration has a stronger effect 
on the accounting measure of performance ROE and ROA than on the market 
measure of performance Q and MBR ratios.  
 
Now, we address the issue of the effects of ownership mix on the performance of the 
firms. The relevant hypothesis is that if ownership mix is irrelevant to firm 
performance, then the ownership fractions will be expected to be insignificant in Eq. 
1. Otherwise, if this null hypothesis is rejected, the government ownership FGO is 
hypothesized to be negatively related to a firm’s performance as its main focus is on 
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social benefit rather than the firm’s profit. It is hypothesized that firms with both 
foreign and institutional ownership will have higher performance.  
 
The results in Table 6 indicate that the FGO, the fraction of equity owned by 
government, has a negative coefficient in ROE performance equations, and it is 
statistically significant at a 10% level of significance. The FFO also, has a negative 
coefficient in both ROE and ROA measure of performance, but none of these 
coefficients are significant at any level of significance. The FIN, the fraction of equity 
owned by institution shareholders, does not seem to have any significant impact on 
the profitability of firms as measured by ROE, ROA, Q, and MBR.  
 
There are some conflicting results of the sign of coefficients between the one 
estimated from both ROE and ROA equations and the one from the Q-equations. The 
FFO, the fraction of equity owned by foreigner, has a negative coefficient in Q, and it 
is significant at a 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the government 
ownership fraction has positive coefficients and they are significant in the Q 
regressions in both Table 6 and Table 7. However, we would argue that the 
explanatory power for both ROE and ROA regressions is fairly high with adjusted R-
squared ranging from 50 to 73 percent, while the adjusted R-squared is merely 5 to 15 
percent for both MBR and Q equations. Furthermore, the F statistics are significant 
and very high for the two measures of performance ROE and ROA, but very low 
though it is still significant, for the Q measure of performance.  
 
The significance of ownership characteristics in the equations for ROA and ROE 
could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, 
measured by its financial indicator ROA and ROE are the most important factors used 
by investors in Jordan to assess a firm’s performance rather than other measures of 
performance such as MBR, and Q. This result is consistent with the result of Abdel 
Shahid (2003) that ROA is the most important factor used by investors. The research 
finding is consistent with the result of Wu and Cui (2002) that there is a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits, indicated by 
ROA. Thus, investors depend heavily in evaluating their investment on the accounting 
performance measure, ROA. The results of empirical investigation are consistent with 
Abdel Shahid (2003), and support the theory that there is a relationship between 
ownership structure and a firm’s health, according to Jensen and Meckling, (1976).  
 
In all regressions, both the controlling variable firm’s size, ASS, and firm’s growth, 
NI/CAP, have a positive impact on the firm’s performance measures ROE and ROA, 
and they are significant at least at a 5% level of significance. While TD/TE, and 
LTD/TA are found to have a negative impact on both the ROE and ROA, and they are 
mostly significant at a 5% level of significance. Firm’s age, AGE, is found to have a 
positive but not significant effect on the firm performance measures: ROE, ROA, and 
MBR. In general, the sign of the coefficients for those control variables are in 
consistent with previous findings. Five industry dummy variables are included as 
control variables and their coefficients are not significant at any level of significance. 
We also found that none of the coefficients for the dummy variables for years had any 
level of significance. Therefore, our results were robust between different years and 
across different industrial sectors. 
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4.2 Ownership Structure and Default Risk 
 
As discussed above, both ownership structure and mix have a significant impact on 
the accounting measure of performance ROE. Also, ownership concentration has a 
significant impact on the accounting measure of performance ROA. Therefore, we 
might use ownership structure and mix as indicators of a firm’s health to predict the 
probability of default (PD). Table 8 summarizes government, citizen, institutional, 
and foreigner participation in both defaulted and non-defaulted firms. It is expected 
that government ownership reduces the probability of default, 61% of the non-
defaulted firms have government participation compared with 54% of the defaulted 
firms. Foreign ownership also expected to have a significant impact on the probability 
of default, as 90% of the non defaulted firms have foreign participation compared 
with 39% of the defaulted firms. Institutional ownership is expected to have a positive 
impact on a firm’s performance, the institution choose there investment to maximize 
its profit so it choose the successful projects. 
 
Insert Table 8 Here 
To further examine the issue of a firm’s default risk, we conduct a test to estimate the 
probability of default. Many studies used the probit model in default studies such as 
Zmijewski (1984), Acharya, Chatterjee and Pal (2003) and Ginoglou, Agorastos and 
Hatzigagios (2002). The Probit and logit models are formulated for the Jordanian 
companies’ conditions and contain two state dependent variables stat 1= default and 
stat 0= non-default.  
 
To investigate whether ownership concentration and mix contributes to a firm’s 
default, let Y* represent firm’s status with *
i
Y  as the latent factor. Yi = 1 if Y* is less 
than or equal zero if the firm is in default. CR represents ownership concentration 
ratios, C5 and HERF. Ownership fraction (F); F= FGO, FFO, and FIN. ε  is the 
stochastic disturbance term corresponding to the ith (estimated error), ε  is N(0,1). If 
ownership structure is irrelevant to default probability, the ownership concentration 
and fraction will be insignificant. We also would find there is no correlation between 
Y* and CR and F. Our basic estimating equation is the following; 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
* ( ) ( / )
( / )
i
Y Log Assets AGE TD TA
NI CAP CR F
β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
                                     (2) 
Government ownership, FGO, is hypothesized to be negatively related to the firm’s 
default, as their main focus is on social benefit rather than profit. Priorities of 
government do not necessarily coincide with firm's performance maximization. For 
instance, the government may care more about unemployment or control over certain 
strategic industries than the value of state assets. The government will support the 
distress firms even until the last moment. Government ownership could affect the 
firm's performance negatively but it will definitely decrease the probability of default. 
Institutional shareholders (FIN) are more profit oriented and may have more incentive 
to monitor the firm. It is hypothesized that firms with institutional ownership FIN will 
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have a lower probability of default as they monitor the firm more and their goal is 
profit maximization. 
 
Foreign shareholders (FFO) are also more profit oriented than government and may 
also have more incentive to monitor the firm. It is hypothesized that firms with 
foreign ownership FFO will have a lower probability of default. Furthermore, 
ownership concentration C5 is expected to have a negative effect on the probability of 
default. Four control variables are used in this study: the firm’s size, the firm’s age, 
TD/TA, and the growth ratio NI/CAP. These variables are expected to contribute to a 
firm’s default. It is expected that firms with a high debt ratio will have a high PD and 
firms with a high profit ratio will have a low PD. Furthermore it is argued that firm's 
with big size and age will have a low probability of default. 
 
The models were estimated by using the Stata.8 software package. The software uses 
a procedure that estimates the binary model via maximum likelihood for the probit 
model. Estimation results of equation (2) using both logit and probit models are given 
in Table 9 and Table 10.  
 
Insert Table 9 Here 
Insert Table 10 Here 
 
The FGO, the fraction of equity owned by government, is found to have a negative 
coefficient in default risk equation, and it is statistically significant at a 5% level of 
significance using the logit model in Table 9. The FGO is statistically significant at a 
1% level of significance using the Probit model in Table 10. This indicates that 
government ownership decreases the probability of default (PD) as the government 
has other objectives rather than that of profit. This result is consistent with other 
studies such as Lizal (2002) who finds that government ownership reduces the 
probability of default (PD). The FFO, the fraction of equity owned by foreigner, has a 
positive coefficient and it is insignificant at any level of significances. The FIN, the 
fraction of equity owned by institution shareholders does not seem to have any 
significant impact on the probability of default, while the coefficient of the 
institutional ownership is negative. 
 
From the results of the estimation of the logit models in Table 9, we find that the 
ownership concentration measure C5 has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of default, and the effect is statistically significant at a 5% level of 
significance in model 1 and model 3. In model 4 we find that the ownership 
concentration C5 is not significant in combination with the fraction of foreign owners, 
but it still has a negative effect on default risk. Our finding also supports the findings 
in the previous section that ownership concentration increases a firm’s performance 
which reflects a firm’s health nut it also increase the PD. The estimated coefficient of 
the HERF is not significant at any level of significance. The impact of ownership mix 
with ownership concentration measure HERF does not affect the significance of 
government ownership FGO. Government ownership is still significant at a 5% level 
of significance. Neither FFO nor FIN has any explanatory power in predicting the 
probability of default. Controlling variables such as the firm’s size, ASS, and the 
firm’s age, AGE, do not have any explanatory power in predicting the default risk. In 
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contrast, a firm’s growth, NI/CAP, has a significant effect on the probability of 
default. This result is not consistent with theory that firms with high growth have a 
low probability of default. 
 
We obtain similar results using the probit estimation models in Table 10, but the 
results were better than using the logit model. For the logit models the Pseudo 2R is 
ranging from 47 to 60 percent, while the LR ranging from 38 to 49 percent and it is 
statistically significant in the corresponding asymptotic Chi-squared distribution at a 
high level of significance. On the other hand, for the probit models, the Pseudo 
2R ranging from 48 to 60 percent, while the LR ranging from 39 to 59 percent, and it 
is statistically significant in the corresponding asymptotic Chi-squared distribution. 
The results of the probit models are better compared with the logit models.  
 
Similar to the results in the performance regressions, we also found that none of the 
coefficients for the dummy variables for years and for industrial sectors are significant 
at any level of significance. Therefore, our results are robust between different years 





The possible impact of ownership structure on a firm’s performance has been a 
central question in research on corporate governance, but evidence on the nature of 
this relationship has been decidedly mixed. While some theories and empirical 
investigations suggest that ownership structure affects firm performance, some others 
suggest the irrelevance of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and 
concentration and firm performance in Jordanian publicly traded firms for a sample of 
59 firms from 1989-2002. This paper not only studies the relationship between 
ownership structure, mix and firm’s performance, more importantly this study 
investigates the ownership structures and mix of defaulted firms compared with non 
defaulted firms.  
 
The paper produces significant and consistent results. First, we find that there is a 
significant relation between ownership concentration C5 and the accounting 
performance measure ROE and ROA. Secondly, the HERF is not significant at any 
level of significance in any measure of performance. The insignificance of the HERF 
shows that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration 
and a firm’s performance. Thirdly, we also found that there is a negative significant 
relation between government ownership and a firm’s accounting performance, while 
the other ownership structure mixes have significant coefficients only in Tobin’s Q 
performance measure. 
 
This paper also used the ownership structure to predict the probability of default. Our 
results suggested that individual shareholders have no incentive and no capability to 
monitor and influence the behavior of management. Furthermore, a certain degree of 
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ownership concentration is needed to increase the firm’s performance and to decrease 
firm’s chance of default. We also found that government ownership is negatively 
related to the probability of default, and the result is significant at a 5% level. 
Government ownership was found to decrease the probability of default, but it has a 
negative on a firm’s performance. Our results suggest that increasing a firm’s 
performance by reducing government participation in a firm’s ownership will cause 
some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the short term. Therefore, we suggest a 
privatization reform should go gradually and government should provide all necessary 
social securities to reduce the negative social impact of a firms’ liquidation. Further 
research is needed by increasing a larger sample in the study. 
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Table 1 Ownership Concentration of Defaulted Firms 
Ownership Concentration of defaulted firms 
Variable Definition Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum 
C1 Largest shareholder 28.29786 25.58 0.00 22.39 99.00 
C2 Largest two shareholders 36.2275 27.47839 0 36 99 
C3 Largest three shareholders 39.10179 29.2407 0 38.555 99 
C5 Largest five shareholders 40.39821 30.22506 0 38.555 99 
HERF 
Herfindahl index of 
ownership  1609.41 2416.03 0 810.19 9801 
 
Table 2 Ownership Concentration of non-defaulted Firms 
Ownership Concentration of non-defaulted firm's 
Variable Definition Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum 
C1 Largest shareholder 24.13226 19.23575 0 19.56 87.7 
C2 Largest two shareholders 31.9071 23.7396 0 27.4 87.7 
C3 Largest three shareholders 33.80968 24.76374 0 27.7 87.7 
C5 Largest five shareholders 34.61677 26.02797 0 27.7 87.7 
HERF 
Herfindahl index of 
ownership  1109.995 1561.081 0 470.89 7691.29 
 
Table 3 Owners participation in industrial and services firms 
 
number of firms block 
holders participate in  
Percentage in firms 
participation  
Individual 
participants 161 0.975758 
Arab 122 0.739394 
Foreigners 47 0.284849 
Companies 157 0.951515 
Government 103 0.624242 
Arab and Foreigner 131 0.793939 




Table 4 Characteristics of Ownership Structure  
Defaulted Firms Non-defaulted Firms 
Variable mean SD Median mean SD Median 
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Government ownership 13.079 25.176 0.982 17.798 25.401 3.856 
Individual Ownership 48.109 32.755 52.323 45.151 25.116 46.346 
Companies ownership 24.847 26.449 13.514 25.442 23.004 15.353 






















Table 5 Description of Variables 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROA                       Net income/ total assets 
ROE                       Net income/ total equity 
Tobin’s Q             (Market value of equity+ book value of debt)/book value of assets  
MBR                     Market value of equity/ Book value of equity 
Government          Percentage of share held by government 
Arab                      Percentage of shares held by Arab 
Foreign                 Percentage of shares held by Foreigner 
Individual             Percentage of shares held by individual 
Companies (Institution)      Percentage of shares held by institution 
Firm Size                            Logarithm of the total assets 
Firm’s age                           log of years  
TD/TE                                Total debt/ total equity 
LTD/TA                             Long term debt/total assets 
NI/CAP                              Net income/ Capitalization 
TD/TA                                Total debt/ total assets 
C5                                      Larges five shareholders 
Herf index                         the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top 
five shareholders 
Dummy 1                             Manufacture 
Dummy 2                             Steel and mining 
Dummy 3                             Trade 
Dummy 4                              Utility 
Dummy 5                              Real estate  
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Table 6 Ownerships Concentration (C5) and Mix and Firm’s performance 
 
        Constant     ASS       AGE      TD/TE      LTD/TA     NI/CAP       C5          FGO         FFO        FIN      Adj. 
2R        F-Stat 
 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROE   -1.86         0.27      0.039        -0.14           -0.54           0.24        0.28       -2.44                                                0.73        23.66 
          (-5.18)a    (4.80)a    (0.40)     (-8.08)a     (-1.76)C     (2.65)a     (2.44)b   (-1.79)c   
 
ROE   -1.90           0.28      - 0.006      -0.14          -0.77            0.22       0.18                     -0.10                                   0.72      21.99 
          (-5.14)a      (5.01)a    (-0.07)    (-7.80)a      (-2.65)b       (2.41)b   (1.78)c                (-0.53)  
 
ROE   -1.87           0.27     - 0.0006      -0.14          -0.70           0.23       0.14                                          0.18                  0.73    23.16 
          (-5.17)a      (4.86)a    (-0.01)    (-7.96)a      (-2.44)a       (2.64)c    (1.41)                                      (1.53) 
 
ROA    -1.32         0.18       0.02          0.02          -0.30          0.26           0.15       -0.05                                                 0.53     10.20 
           (-5.74) a    (5.09)a    (0.24)      (1.68)c      (-1.52)     (4.65)a        (2.07)b    (-0.59) 
 
ROA   -1.33           0.18       0.005      0.02          -0.35            0.26          0.13                     -0.013                                   0.52    10.08 
          (-5.75)a      (5.22a     (0.08)      (1.69)c     (-1.90)c      (4.58)a      (2.05)b                   (-0.10) 
 
ROA   -1.32           0.18       0.008       0.019         -0.33           0.26        0.12                                           0.052              0.50    10.85 
          (-5.75)a      (5.12)a    (0.13)      (1.70)c      (-1.80)c         (4.67)a    (1.87)c                                      (0.70) 
 
Q        2.55          -0.31         0.50        -0.09         0.79             -0.10         -0.18      0.90                                                   0.14     2.38 
          (2.23) b     (-1.79)c    (1.64)      (-1.63)      (0.81)         (-0.35)      (-0.49)     (2.08)a 
 
Q        2.60           -0.36         0.77       -0.09         1.38           0.06           0.28                          -1.26                                   0.14   2.39 
         (2.28)b       (-2.08)b     (2.64)b   (-1.69)c    (1.54)         (0.2)          (0.87                     (-2.09)b 
 
Q        2.71           -0.39        0.72         -0.10          1.71          0.05         0.13                                              0.39                  0.09   1.81 
          (2.30)b      (-2.18)b   (2.39)b    (-1.65)        (1.84)c      (0.16)       (0.40)                                           (1.02) 
 
MBR   2.45          -0.30         0.11        0.19          1.46          0.76          1.00         -0.15                                                    -0.06   0.54 
           (0.86)       (-0.68)       (0.14)     (1.43)        (0.60)        (1.09)      (1.09)       (-0.41) 
 
MBR   2.35           -0.28         0.23       0.15          1.04           0.70         1.04                         -1.62                                 - 0.04    0.72 
          (0.83)        (-0.64)       (0.25)    (1.46)         (0.48)         (1.20)     (1.32)                        (-1.09) 
 
MBR    2.50         -0.31        0.10         0.19          1.44            0.79         0.88                                                    0.33         -0.06   0.55 
          (0.87)        (-0.71)     (0.13)       (1.43)        (0.64)          (1.13)      (1.09                                                 (0.36) 
 
Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.  
































Table 7 Ownerships Concentration (HERF) and Mix and Firm’s performance 
 
        Constant     ASS       AGE      TD/TE      LTD/TA     NI/CAP    HERF          FGO         FFO        FIN      Adj. 
2R        F-Stat 
 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROE   -1.86         0.28        0.03        -0.14           -0.67           0.22        0.19       -0.15                                                 0.71        21.08 
          (-4.94)a    (4.81)a      (0.31)     (-7.71)a      (-2.14)b     (2.35)b     (1.11)   (-1.08)   
 
ROE   -1.88          0.29       0.007      -0.14          -0.79            0.20         0.10                       -0.06                                0.71        20.50 
          (-4.97)a     (4.97)a    (0.01)    (-7.65)a        (-2.65)a      (2.20)b    (1.64)c                   (0.31) 
 
ROE   -1.86           0.27      0.01      -0.14              -0.70           0.23       0.03                                          0.21                  0.72     22.04 
          (-5.04)a      (4.83)a   (0.10)    (-7.91)a       (-2..39)b     (2.49)c    (0.21)                                      (1.71)c  
 
ROA   -1.32         0.19      0.012        0.017           -0.37           0.25        0.12       -0.008                                                0.50       9.20 
          (-5.55)a    (5.11)a    (0.19)     (1.51)         (-1.86)C     (4..34)a     (1.07)      (-0.09)   
 
ROA   -1.32          0.19       0.009      0.018          -0.37            0.25       0.11                        0.02                                     0.50      9.21 
          (-5.56)a     (5.17)a    (0.15)    (1.52)         (-1.98)b       (4.36)a   (1.19)c                    (0.15)  
 
ROA   -1.32          0.18       0.014       0.017         -0.35           0.26        0.09                                           0.06              0.50        9.41 
          (-5.57)a      (5.06)a    (0.24)      (1.49)      (-1.86)c        (4..49)a    (0.35)                                      (0.42) 
 
Q        2.52          -0.31         0.48        -0.09         0.84             -0.11         -0.38      0.95                                                   0.15      2.43 
          (2.21) b     (-1.78)c    (1.59)     (-1.70)c      (0.88)         (-0.40)      (-0.73)     (2.20)b 
 
Q        2.62           -0.35         0.78       -0.10         1.34           0.04         0.17                           -1.19                                   0.13    2.28 
         (2.28)b       (-2.03)b     (2.66)a   (-1.73)c    (1.47)         (0.13)        (0.38)                     (-1.98)b   
 
Q        2.72           -0.39        0.73         -0.10          1.69          0.04         0.07                                              0.40                  0.09   1.78 
          (2.31)b      (-2.17)b   (2.42)a    (-1.67)b        (1.81)c      (0.13)       (0.14)                                          (1.05) 
 
MBR   2.43          -0.24         0.04        0.17         0.92            0.64         0.20        0.37                                                       -0.09   0.36 
           (0.84)       (-0.54)       (0.77)     (1.23)      (0.38)          (0.90)      (0.16)      (0.34) 
 
MBR   2.43           -0.25         0.22       0.17         0.96            0.74         0.40                          -1.40                                  - 0.07   0.47 
          (0.85)        (-0.56)       (0.30)    (1.21)        (0.42)          (1.05)       (0.36)                        (-0.93)      
 
MBR    2.55         -0.29        0.16         0.17          1.38            0.74         0.27                                                    0.48          -0.09   0.38 
          (0.88)        (-0.66)     (0.22)       (1.21)        (0.60)          (1.04)      (0.23)                                                 (0.52) 
 
Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.  





Table 8 Ownership participation in both default and non-default 
 Default Non-Defaulted Firms 
Government ownership 0.5357143 0.612903 
Individual ownership 0.9642857 1 
Companies ownership 0.8928571 0.935484 

























Table 9 Ownerships Concentration and Mix and Firm’s Default Risk using Logit 
Model 
 
           Constant      ASS      AGE      TD/TA     NI/CAP     C5    HERF    FGO     FFO    FIN   Pseudo 
2R   LR Chi 2   Prob>chi2 
 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1  5.02       -1.23        -0.58        5.26        -14.96       5.00            -7.76                                      0.60               49.20         0.00 
              (0.70)    (-1.08)     (-0.37)      (1.70)c      (-2.28)b   (2.34)b         (-2.43)b 
 
Model 2   9.12     -1.55         -1.65          3.71        -8.43         2.43                         0.58                          0.49                40.32      0.00 
               (131)    (-1.46)      (-1.20)      (1.53)       (-1.94)b   (1.59)                        (0.24) 
 
Model 3   9.72     -1.61        -1.62         3.65         - 8.26         2.57                                     -0.58              0.49               40.41      0.00 
               (1.36)   (-1.49)     (-1.20)     (1.50)        (-1.93)b     (1.64)c                                 (-0.38) 
 
Model 4    7.43     -1.40        -0.54        5.11           -9.99                   5.38        -5.93                                0.56             45.47        0.00 
                 (1.04)   (1.26)      (-0.36)      (1.71)c      (-2.07)b              (1.49)      (-2.27)b 
 
Model 5   9.79   - 1.56         -1.52          3.70           - 7.16                  1.96                  0.86                       0.47            38.74        0.00 
                (141)   (-1.50)      (-1.14)       (1.57)         (-1.83)c             (1.07)                (0.36) 
 
Model 6   10.69   -1.66       - 1.50          3.67           - 6.85                    2.32                            -0.77           0.48           38.83       0.00 
                (1.48)   (-1.55)    (-1.16)        (1.56)         (-1.80)c                (1.14)                          (-0.47) 
 
Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.  





Table 10 Ownerships Concentration and Mix and Firm’s Default Risk using 
Probit Model 
 
         Constant      ASS      AGE      TD/TA     NI/CAP     C5    HERF    FGO      FFO    FIN    Pseudo 
2R   LR Chi 2  Prob>chi2 
 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1  3.05       -0.75      -0.25      2.92        -8.33        2.94                 -4.22                                     0.60              49.33         0.00 
              (0.73)     (-1.13)   (-0.27)   (1.65)c     (-2.31)b   (2.38)b            -(2.49)a 
 
Model 2  5.27      -0.90      - 0.94       2.19       -4.77        1.34                              0.30                          0.50              40.44         0.00 
              (136)    (-1.53)     (-1.14)    (1.55)     (-1.97)b    (1.54)                           (0.20) 
 
Model 3   5.42       - 0.91      -0.92       2.17        -4.66       1.39                                           -0.20            0.50            40.45        0.00 
               (1.39)    (-1.55)     (-1.14)    (1.53)    -(1.96)b   (1.57)                                       (-0.22) 
 
Model 4  4.53      -0.86       - 0.27       2.92        -5.69                    3.27       -3.27                                  0.56              45.66        0.00 
             (1.09)    (-1.33)      (-0.32)    (1.71)c    (-2.12)b               (1.57)     (-232)b 
 
Model 5  5.67      -0.92      -0.89         2.28        - 4.20                   1.22                    0.44                        0.48             39.12        0.00 
              (147)     (-1.58)      (-1.11)    (1.63)      (-1.86)c               (1.07)                 (0.31) 
 
Model 6  5.94      -0.94        -0.87       2.52         -4.04                    1.36                              -0.32           0.48              39.14      0.00 
              (1.52)    (-1.62)     (-1.11)     (1.62)     (-1.83)c                 (1.09)                            (-0.34) 
 
   
Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.  
a, b, c: indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
